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Abstract
We determine the quality of randomized social choice mechanisms in a setting in
which the agents have metric preferences: every agent has a cost for each alternative,
and these costs form a metric. We assume that these costs are unknown to the mech-
anisms (and possibly even to the agents themselves), which means we cannot simply
select the optimal alternative, i.e. the alternative that minimizes the total agent cost
(or median agent cost). However, we do assume that the agents know their ordinal
preferences that are induced by the metric space. We examine randomized social choice
functions that require only this ordinal information and select an alternative that is
good in expectation with respect to the costs from the metric. To quantify how good a
randomized social choice function is, we bound the distortion, which is the worst-case
ratio between expected cost of the alternative selected and the cost of the optimal al-
ternative. We provide new distortion bounds for a variety of randomized mechanisms,
for both general metrics and for important special cases. Our results show a sizable
improvement in distortion over deterministic mechanisms.
1 Introduction
Social choice, and especially the recent field of computational social choice, is a large and
exciting subfield of artificial intelligence research (see for example [13,28] for some surveys and
connections with other areas of AI). The goal of social choice theory is usually to aggregate
the preferences of many agents with conflicting interests, and produce an outcome that is
suitable to the whole rather than to any particular agent. This is accomplished via a social
choice mechanism which maps the preferences of the agents, usually represented as total
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orders over the set of alternatives, to a single winning alternative. There is no agreed upon
“best” social choice mechanism; it is not obvious how one can even make this determination.
Because of this, much of social choice literature is concerned with defining normative or
axiomatic criteria, so that a social choice mechanism is “good” if it satisfies many useful
criteria.
Another method of determining the quality of a social choice function is the utilitarian
approach, which is often used in welfare economics and algorithmic mechanism design. Here
agents have an associated utility (or cost, as in this paper) with each alternative that is a
measure of how desirable (or undesirable) an alternative is to an agent. We can define the
quality of an alternative to be a function of these agent utilities, for example as the sum of
all agent utilities for a particular alternative. Other objective functions such as the median
or max utility of the agents for a fixed alternative can be used as well. The utilitarian
approach has received a lot of attention recently in the social choice literature [9,18,19,24],
see especially [6] for a thorough discussion of this approach, its strengths, and its weaknesses.
A frequent criticism of the utilitarian approach is that it is unreasonable to assume that
the mechanism, or even the agents themselves, know what their utilities are. Indeed, it can
be difficult for an agent to quantify the desirability of an alternative into a single number,
but there are arguments in favor of cardinal utilities [6,24]. Even if the agents were capable
of doing this for each alternative, it could be difficult for us to elicit these utilities in order
to compute the optimal alternative. It is much more reasonable, and much more common,
to assume that the agents know the preference rankings induced by their utilities over the
alternatives. That is, it might be difficult for an agent to express exactly how she feels about
alternatives X and Y , but she should know if she prefers X to Y . Because of this, work such
as [1, 6, 9, 18, 33] considers how well social choice mechanisms can perform when they only
have access to ordinal preferences of the agents, i.e., their rankings over the alternatives,
instead of the true underlying (possibly latent) utilities. The distortion of a social choice
function is defined here as the worst-case ratio of the cost of the alternative selected by the
social choice function and the cost of the truly optimal alternative.
Our goal in this work is to design social choice mechanisms that minimize the worst-
case distortion for the sum and median objective functions when the agents have metric
preferences [1]. That is, we assume that the costs of agents over alternatives form an arbitrary
metric space and that their preferences are induced by this metric space. Assuming such
metric or spatial preferences is common [16], has a natural interpretation of agents liking
candidates/alternatives which are most similar to them, such as in facility location literature
[8,17,18], and our setting is sufficiently general that it does not impose any restrictions on the
set of allowable preference profiles. Anshelevich et al. [1] provide distortion bounds for this
setting using well-known deterministic mechanisms such as plurality, Copeland, and ranked
pairs. We improve on these results by providing distortion guarantees for randomized social
choice functions, which output a probability distribution over the set of alternatives rather
than a single winning alternative. We show that our randomized mechanisms perform better
than any deterministic mechanism, and provide optimal randomized mechanisms for various
settings.
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We also examine the distortion of randomized mechanisms in important specialized set-
tings. Many of our worst-case examples occur when many agents are indifferent between
their top alternative and the optimal alternative. In many settings, however, agents are
more decisive about their top choice, and prefer it much more than any other alternative.
We introduce a formal notion of decisiveness, which is a measure of how strongly an agent
feels about her top preference relative to her second choice. If an agent is very decisive, then
she is very close to her top choice compared to her second choice in the metric space. In the
extreme case, this means that the set of agents and alternatives is identical [23], as can occur
for example when proposal writers rank all the other proposals being submitted, or when
a committee must choose one of its members to lead it. We demonstrate that when agents
are decisive, the distortion greatly improves, and quantify the relation between decisiveness
and the performance of social choice mechanisms. Finally, we consider other natural special
cases, such as when preferences are 1-Euclidean and when alternatives are vertices of a sim-
plex. 1-Euclidean preferences are already recognized as a well-studied and well-motivated
special case [15, 34]. The setting in which alternatives form a simplex corresponds to the
case in which alternatives share no similarities, i.e., when all alternatives are equally different
from each other.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we bound the worst-case distortion of several randomized social choice func-
tions in many different settings. Recall that the distortion is the worst-case ratio of the
expected value of the alternative selected by the randomized mechanism and the optimal
alternative. We use two different objective functions for the purpose of defining the quality of
an alternative. The first is the sum objective, which defines the social cost of an alternative
to be the sum of agent costs for that particular alternative. We also consider the median
objective, which defines the quality of an alternative as the median agent’s cost for that
alternative.
We summarize our results in Table 1. Note that for the sum objective, these results are
also given for α-decisive metric spaces. A metric space is α-decisive if for every agent, the
cost of her first choice is less than α times the cost of her second choice, for some α ∈ [0, 1].
In other words, this provides a constraint on how indifferent an agent can be between her
first and second choice. By definition, any agent cost function is 1-decisive. Considering
α-decisive metric spaces allows us to immediately give results for important subcases, such
as 0-decisive metric spaces in which every agent has distance 0 to her top alternative, i.e.,
every agent is also an alternative.
For the sum objective function, we begin by giving a lower bound of 1 + α for all ran-
domized mechanisms, which corresponds to a lower bound of 2 for general metric spaces.
This is smaller than the lower bound of 3 for deterministic mechanisms from [1]. One of
our first results is to show randomized dictatorship has worst-case distortion strictly better
than 3, which is better than any possible deterministic mechanism. Furthermore, we show
that a generalization of the “proportional to squares” mechanism is the optimal randomized
mechanism when there are two alternatives, i.e., it has a distortion of 1 + α.
Sum Median
General α-Decisive General
General RD: 3− 2
n
2 + α− 2
n Uncovered Set Min-Cover: 4
1-Euclidean 1-D Prop. to Squares: 2 1 + α Condorcet: 3
Simplex Prop. to Squares: 2 1
2
(
1 + α +
√
2
√
α2 + 1
)
Majority consistent: 2
Lower Bounds 2 1 + α 1-Euclidean: 3
Table 1: The worst-case distortion of our social choice mechanisms are given for both the sum
and median objective functions in various settings. In the general setting, all randomized
mechanisms have a lower bound of 2 and 3 for the sum and median objective functions,
respectively. For the α-decisive setting with the sum objective function, no randomized
mechanism can have distortion better than 1 + α.
We also examine how well randomized mechanisms perform in important subcases. We
consider the well-known case in which all agents and alternatives are points on a line with
the Euclidean metric, known as 1-Euclidean preferences [15]. We give an algorithm, which
heavily relies on proportional to squares, to achieve the optimal distortion bound of 1+α for
any number of alternatives. We also consider a case first briefly described in [1], known as
the (m−1)-simplex setting, in which the alternatives are vertices of a simplex and the agents
lie in the simplex. This corresponds to alternatives sharing no similarities. We are able to
show that proportional to squares achieves worst-case distortion of 1
2
(
1 + α+
√
2
√
α2 + 1
)
,
which is fairly close to the optimal bound of 1 + α. For details, see Section 3.3.
Our other major contribution is defining a new randomized mechanism for the median
objective which achieves a distortion of 4 in arbitrary metric spaces (we call this mecha-
nism Uncovered Set Min-Cover). This requires forming a very specific distribution over all
alternatives in the uncovered set, and then showing that this distribution ensures that no
alternative “covers” more than half of the total probability of all alternatives. We do this by
taking advantage of LP-duality combined with properties of the uncovered set. We believe
that this mechanism is interesting on its own, as it is likely to have other nice properties in
addition to low median distortion.
1.2 Related Work
Embedding the unknown cardinal preferences of agents into an ordinal space and measuring
the distortion of social choice functions that operate on these ordinal preferences was first
done in [33]. Additional papers [1,6,9,18,30] have since studied distortion and other related
concepts of many different mechanisms with various assumptions about the utilities/costs of
the agents. In this context, Anshelevich et al. introduced the notion of metric preferences
in [1], which assumes the costs of the agents and alternatives form a metric. For this setting,
Anshelevich et al. [1] proved that while various scoring rules such as Plurality and Borda can
have very large distortion, the Copeland social choice function always has distortion at most
4
5, and in fact no deterministic social choice function can have worst-case distortion better
than 3. For the median distortion objective, they proved that Copeland still achieves dis-
tortion of 5, and in fact no deterministic function can have worst-case distortion better than
5; thus in terms of worst-case distortion Copeland is optimal for this objective. We further
extend their work by considering randomized mechanisms instead of deterministic ones and
exploring special types of metrics. The randomized mechanisms we provide have smaller ex-
pected distortion than the deterministic mechanisms from [1], and in fact sometimes perform
better than any deterministic mechanism possibly could.
Using mechanisms to select alternatives from a metric space when the true locations of
agents is unknown is also reminiscent of facility location games [8, 17]. However, we select
only a single winning alternative in our setting, while in these papers, they select multiple
facilities.
Pivato [31] demonstrates that social choice functions like Borda and approval voting are
able to maximize the utility with high probability, when the agents satisfy certain properties.
Rivest and Shen [35] use a game-theoretic model to compare two voting systems and develop
a randomized mechanism that is always preferred to any other voting system.
Assuming that the preferences of agents are induced by a metric is a type of spatial
preference [16, 26]. There are many other notions of spatial preferences that are prevalent
in social choice, such as 1-Euclidean preferences [15, 34], single-peaked preferences [37], and
single-crossing [22]. We consider 1-Euclidean preferences as an important special case of the
metric preferences we study in this paper.
Randomized social choice was first studied in [20,25,38]. A similar setting was considered
by Fishburn and Gehrlein [21], in which agents are uncertain about their preferences and
express their preferences using probability distributions. We consider several randomized
mechanisms, such as randomized dictatorship [12]; other randomized voting mechanisms
have been used in, e.g., [7, 32]. The use of randomized mechanisms is seen very frequently
in literature concerning one-sided matchings. Random serial dictatorship and probabilistic
serial are perhaps the most well-studied randomized mechanisms, and there is a significant
amount of literature on them (e.g. [3–5, 10, 14, 19]). In particular, the results of [2, 19] are
analogous to finding the distortion of matching mechanisms.
Related to the notion of randomized social choice functions are proportional representa-
tion voting systems in which there are multiple winners [11, 27, 29, 36]. Selecting multiple
winners is conceptually similar to having a probability distribution over a set of alterna-
tives. Skowron et al. [36] consider approximation algorithms to multiwinner rules that seek
to maximize global objective functions, but are NP-hard to solve.
Finally, independently from us, Feldman et al. have also recently considered the distortion
of randomized social choice functions in [18]. While they mostly focus on truthful mechanisms
(i.e., the ”strategic” setting), there is some intersection between our results. Specifically,
Feldman et al. also give a bound of 3 (and a lower bound of 2) for arbitrary metric spaces
in the sum objective, and also provides a mechanism with distortion 2 for the 1-Euclidean
case. The latter mechanism is quite different from ours, however: ours seems to be somewhat
simpler, but the mechanism from [18] has the advantage of being truthful. However, Feldman
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et al. do not consider either α-decisive voters or the median objective: showing better
performance for decisive voters and designing better mechanisms for the median objective
are two of our major contributions.
2 Preliminaries
Social Choice with Ordinal Preferences. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of agents,
and let M = {A1, A2, . . . , Am} be the set of alternatives. Let S be the set of all total orders
on the set of alternatives M . We will typically use i, j to refer to agents and W,X, Y, Z to
refer to alternatives. Every agent i ∈ N has a preference ranking σi ∈ S; by X ≻i Y we will
mean that X is preferred over Y in ranking σi. We call the vector σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) ∈ Sn a
preference profile. We say that an alternative X pairwise defeats Y if |{i ∈ N : X ≻i Y }| >
n
2
. Furthermore, we use the following notation to describe sets of agents with particular
preferences: XY = {i ∈ N : X ≻i Y } and X∗ = {i ∈ N : X ≻i Y for all Y 6= X}.
Once we are given a preference profile, we want to aggregate the preferences of the
agents and select a single alternative as the winner or find a probability distribution over the
alternatives and pick a single winner according to that distribution. A deterministic social
choice function f : Sn → M is a mapping from the set of preference profiles to the set of
alternatives. A randomized social choice function f : Sn → ∆(M) is a mapping from the set
of preference profiles to the space of all probability distributions over the alternatives ∆(M).
Some well-known social choice functions which we consider in this paper are as follows.
• Randomized dictatorship/plurality: The winning alternative is selected according
to the following probability distribution: for all alternatives Y ∈M ,
p(Y ) =
|Y ∗|
n
.
• Proportional to squares. The winning alternative is selected according to the fol-
lowing probability distribution: for all alternatives Y ∈M ,
p(Y ) =
|Y ∗|2∑
Z∈M |Z∗|2
.
• Condorcet method: A weak Condorcet winner is defined as the alternative that
either pairwise defeats or pairwise ties every other alternative. There can be multiple
weak Condorcet winners. A Condorcet winner must pairwise defeat every other alter-
native; there can be at most one Condorcet winner. Neither weak Condorcet winners
nor Condorcet winners are guaranteed to exist. A Condorcet method is any social
choice function that is guaranteed to select a Condorcet winner, if it exists.
• Majority method: A majority winner is an alternative that is ranked as the first
preference of strictly more than n
2
agents. A majority method is any method that will
select the majority winner, if it exists.
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Cardinal Metric Costs. In our work we take the utilitarian view, and study the case
when the ordinal preferences σ are in fact a result of the underlying cardinal agent costs.
Formally, we assume that there exists an arbitrary metric d : (N ∪M)2 → R≥0 on the set of
agents and alternatives (or more generally a pseudo-metric, since we allow distinct agents and
alternatives to be identical and have distance 0). Here d(i, X) is the cost incurred by agent
i when alternative X is selected as the winner; these costs can be arbitrary but are assumed
to obey the triangle inequality. The metric costs d naturally give rise to a preference profile.
Formally, we say that σ is consistent with d if ∀i ∈ N, ∀X, Y ∈M , if d(i, X) < d(i, Y ), then
X ≻i Y . In other words, if the cost of X is less than the cost of Y for an agent, then the
agent should prefer X over Y . When d(i, X) = d(i, Y ), then both X ≻i Y and Y ≻i X
are considered consistent with the costs of i. Let ρ(d) denote the set of preference profiles
consistent with d (ρ(d) may include several preference profiles if the agent costs have ties).
Similarly, we define ρ−1(σ) to be the set of metrics such that σ ∈ ρ(d).
Social Cost and Distortion. We measure the quality of each alternative using the costs
incurred by all the agents when this alternative is chosen. We use two different notions
of social cost. First, we study the sum objective function, which is defined as SC(X, d) =∑
i∈N d(i, X) for an alternativeX . We also study the median objective function, med(X, d) =
medi∈N(d(i, X)). Since we have defined the cost of alternatives, we can now give the cost of
an outcome of a deterministic social choice function f as SC(f(σ), d) or med(f(σ), d). For
randomized functions, we define the cost of an outcome, which is a probability distribution
over alternatives, as follows: SC(f(σ), d) = EX∼f(σ) [SC(X, d)] =
∑
X∈M p(X) SC(X, d) and
med(f(σ), d) = EX∼f(σ) [med(X, d)] =
∑
X∈M p(X)med(X, d), where p(X) is the probability
of alternative X being selected, according to f(σ). When the metric d is obvious from
context, we will use SC(X) and med(X) as shorthand.
As described in the Introduction, we can view social choice mechanisms in our setting
as attempting to find the optimal alternative (one that minimizes cost), but only having
access to the ordinal preference profile σ, instead of the full underlying costs d. Since it is
impossible to compute the optimal alternative using only ordinal preferences, we would like
to determine how well the aforementioned social choice functions select alternatives based
on their social costs, despite only being given the preference profiles. In particular, we would
like to quantify how the social choice functions perform in the worst-case. To do this, we
use the notion of distortion from [6, 33], defined as follows.
dist∑(f, σ) = sup
d∈ρ−1(σ)
SC(f(σ), d)
minX∈M SC(X, d)
distmed(f, σ) = sup
d∈ρ−1(σ)
med(f(σ), d)
minX∈M med(X, d)
.
In other words, the distortion of a social choice mechanism f on a profile σ is the worst-
case ratio between the social cost of f(σ), and the social cost of the true optimum alternative.
The worst-case is taken over all metrics d which may have induced σ, since the social choice
function does not and cannot know which of these metrics is the true one.
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n
2
agents
X Y
n
2
agents
(1 + ǫ) (1− ǫ)
2
Figure 1: There are n
2
agents located at X who prefer X and n
2
agents between X and Y
who prefer Y . As ǫ→ 0, the expected distortion of randomized dictatorship approaches 2.
⌊n
2
⌋ agents⌊n
2
⌋ agents
X Y
One agent
(1 + ǫ) (1− ǫ) 2
4
2
Figure 2: There are ⌊n
2
⌋ agents located at X who prefer X , one agent between X and Y that
prefers Y , and ⌊n
2
⌋ agents far from either alternative that prefer Y . As ǫ→ 0, the expected
distortion of randomized dictatorship is 3
2
.
Examples. To illustrate some of the behavior arising in our setting, and to build intuition,
here we consider a simple example. Consider the setting in Figure 1 with only two alterna-
tives, X and Y . The preferences are tied: n
2
agents prefer X to Y , and n
2
prefer Y to X .
The ordinal social choice functions we consider do not know anything else; a deterministic
function would be forced to choose a specific alternative (without loss of generality suppose
it is Y ), while randomized dictatorship would choose each alternative with probability 1
2
.
The true, underlying costs could be as follows, however: n
2
agents have cost 0 for X and 2
for Y (these are located “on top of” X), while n
2
agents have cost 1 + ǫ for X and 1 − ǫ
for Y , for some very small ǫ (these are located “between X and Y ”). Then X is the true
optimum solution: the total social cost of X is (1+ ǫ)n
2
, while the social cost of Y is (3−ǫ)n
2
.
Thus, any deterministic function selecting Y has (sum) distortion approaching 3 as ǫ → 0,
while randomized dictatorship has expected distortion approaching 1
2
· 1 + 1
2
· 3 = 2 for this
example.
For the median objective, suppose instead that there is an odd number of voters, with ⌈n
2
⌉
preferring Y and ⌊n
2
⌋ preferring X , as seen in Figure 2. Any reasonable social choice function
would select Y ; randomized dictatorship would once again mix about equally between X and
Y . However, the true numerical costs can be as follows: ⌊n
2
⌋ have cost 0 for X and 2 for Y ,
one agent has cost 1−ǫ for Y and 1+ ǫ for X , and ⌊n
2
⌋ have cost of 2 for Y and 4 for X . The
median agent cost for X is approximately 1, while the median agent cost for Y is 2. Thus,
X is the optimum solution, but random dictatorship only chooses it with probability about
1
2
. For more examples and lower bounds on possible distortion, see Theorems 1 and 12.
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Decisive Voters. Many of our worst-case examples occur when many agents are indifferent
between their top alternative and the optimal alternative. In many settings, however, agents
are more decisive about their top choice, and prefer it much more than any other alternative.
Formally, we say that an agent i whose top choice is W and second choice is X is α-decisive
if d(i,W ) ≤ α · d(i, X) where α ∈ [0, 1]. We say that a metric space is α-decisive if for
some fixed α, every agent is α-decisive. Every metric space is 1-decisive, while a metric
space in which every agent has distance 0 to her top alternative is 0-decisive. In fact, 0-
decisive metric spaces are interesting in their own right: they include the case when each
voter must exactly coincide with some alternative, and so capture the settings where the
set of voters and alternatives is the same. This occurs when every voter corresponds to a
possible alternative, such as when a committee must vote to choose one of its members to
lead it, or when writers of NSF proposals vote for each others’ proposals to be funded.
Note that when talking about α-decisive metrics, ρ−1(σ) denotes the set of all α-decisive
metrics d such that σ is consistent with them (as opposed to the set of all such possible
metrics). Thus, when we consider distortion in the α-decisive setting, it measures the quality
of an algorithm with only ordinal knowledge, as compared to the quality of the true optimum
solution, assuming that the underlying metric is α-decisive.
3 Distortion of the Sum of Agent Costs
3.1 General Metric Spaces
In this section, we examine the sum objective and provide mechanisms with low distortion.
We first show that for general metric spaces, the randomized dictatorship mechanism has
a distortion of less than 3, which is better than any deterministic mechanism, since all
deterministic mechanisms have a worst-case distortion of at least 3 [1]. We then consider the
case of two alternatives, and give the best possible randomized mechanism for this special
case. As it is more general, we consider the α-decisive setting: results for arbitrary metric
spaces are simply the results for 1-decisive agents. In all of our results, we observe that the
worst-case distortion is linearly dependent on α: the more decisive agents are, the better our
mechanisms are able to perform.
We begin this section by addressing the question of how well any randomized social
choice function can perform. Our first theorem shows that no randomized mechanism can
find an alternative that is in expectation within a factor strictly smaller than 1+α from the
optimum alternative for α-decisive metric spaces. Thus no mechanism can have distortion
better than 2 for general metric spaces. In comparison, the best known distortion lower
bound for deterministic mechanisms is equal to 3 (from [1]).
Theorem 1 The worst-case distortion of any randomized mechanism when the metric space
is α-decisive is at least 1 + α.
Proof. We must show that there exists a preference profile such that for all randomized
mechanisms, there always exists an α-decisive metric space that induces the preference profile
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and where the distortion is at least 1 + α. We will consider a preference profile with m = 2
alternatives W,X and n agents (n is even) where n
2
agents prefer W over X and n
2
agents
prefer X over W . We claim that no randomized mechanism can have distortion < 1 + α for
all metric spaces that induce this profile.
First, we will consider an α-decisive metric space that induces the preference profile
and where X is optimal. All agents i who prefer X have d(i, X) = 0 and d(i,W ) = 1.
The remaining agents have d(i,W ) = α
1+α
, d(i, X) = 1
1+α
. Thus, SC(X) = n
2
· 1
1+α
and
SC(W ) = n
2
( α
1+α
+ 1). The distortion of selecting alternative W is SC(W )
SC(X)
= 1 + 2α. Obvi-
ously the distortion of selecting the optimal alternative X is 1. Thus, for any randomized
mechanism, the distortion is p(X) + p(W )(1 + 2α), where p(X), p(W ) are the probabilities
of the randomized mechanism selecting X and W , respectively.
Next, we claim there exists a similar α-decisive metric space that induces the preference
profile and where W is optimal in which the distortion is p(W ) + p(X)(1 + 2α).
Since the mechanism does not know the metric space (or which of X,W is optimal),
it cannot obtain a worst-case distortion better than max(p(X) + p(W )(1 + 2α), p(W ) +
p(X)(1 + 2α)) since either metric space could have induced the preference profile. Clearly,
the worst-case distortion is minimized when
p(X) + p(W )(1 + 2α) = p(W ) + p(X)(1 + 2α).
This reduces to p(W ) = p(X) = 1
2
. We observe that p(X) + p(W ) (1 + 2α) = 1 + α in this
case, which gives us the desired lower bound.
We will now prove several helpful lemmas that are necessary in order to upper-bound the
worst-case distortion of our randomized social choice mechanisms. Our first lemma provides
a refinement over the standard bound of d(i,W ) ≥ 1
2
d(W,Y ) (from [1]) for agents that prefer
Y to W when the agents are in α-decisive spaces and Y is their first preference as well. As
we will see, this latter requirement does not impede our ability to find better lower bounds
for the optimal alternative in α-decisive metrics.
Lemma 2 If a metric space is α-decisive, then for all alternatives W 6= Y , d(i,W ) ≥
1
1+α
· d(W,Y ), for every voter i ∈ Y ∗.
Proof. Consider an α-decisive agent i with top choice Y and second choice Z. W is an
alternative, different from Y . By definition, d(i, Y ) ≤ α · d(i, Z) ≤ α · d(i,W ). We observe
that
d(i,W ) ≥ d(W,Y )− d(i, Y )
≥ d(W,Y )− α · d(i,W ),
which implies that d(i,W ) ≥ 1
1+α
d(W,Y ).
We can now derive an improved lower bound of the social cost of the optimal alternative
X . This is done by applying Lemma 2 to every agent (and with alternative W in the lemma
being set to X) and summing the resulting inequalities.
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Lemma 3 If a metric space is α-decisive, then for any alternative X ∈ M , SC(X) ≥
1
1+α
∑
Y ∈M |Y ∗| · d(X, Y ).
Our next lemma is the first pertaining to upper-bounding the worst-case distortion of ran-
domized social choice functions. This lemma parameterizes the distortion by the probability
distribution over the alternatives. Thus, it is easily used to quickly bound the distortion for
several randomized social choice functions by simply plugging in the appropriate probabilities
for each alternative Y .
Lemma 4 For any instance σ, social choice function f , and α-decisive metric space,
dist∑(f, σ) ≤ 1 + (1 + α)
∑
Y ∈M p(Y )(n− 21+α |Y ∗|)d(X, Y )∑
Y ∈M |Y ∗|d(X, Y )
,
where X is the optimal alternative and p(Y ) is the probability that alternative Y is selected
by f given profile σ.
Proof. Consider an alternative Y 6= X : we want to upper-bound SC(Y ). For all i ∈ Y ∗,
we know that d(i, Y ) ≤ α · d(i, X) by the definition of α-decisiveness. More generally, for
i ∈ Y X , we have a weaker bound of d(i, Y ) ≤ d(i, X). Finally, for i ∈ XY , we can use the
triangle inequality to obtain d(i, Y ) ≤ d(i, X)+ d(X, Y ). Combining these three inequalities
together, we are able to derive
SC(Y ) =
∑
i∈N
d(i, Y )
≤ α
∑
i∈Y ∗
d(i, X) +
∑
i∈Y X\Y ∗
d(i, X) +
∑
i∈XY
(d(i, X) + d(X, Y ))
=
∑
i∈N
d(i, X) + |XY |d(X, Y )− (1− α)
∑
i∈Y ∗
d(i, X)
=
∑
i∈N
d(i, X) + (n− |Y X|)d(X, Y )− (1− α)
∑
i∈Y ∗
d(i, X).
We know that |Y X| ≥ |Y ∗|. Furthermore, by Lemma 2, we know that for i ∈ Y ∗, d(i, X) ≥
1
1+α
d(X, Y ). We can apply these two bounds to our previous expression to conclude that
SC(Y ) ≤
∑
i∈N
d(i, X) + (n− |Y ∗|)d(X, Y )− 1− α
1 + α
|Y ∗|d(X, Y ) (1)
= SC(X) +
(
n− 2
1 + α
|Y ∗|
)
d(X, Y ). (2)
In addition to an upper bound for SC(Y ) where Y 6= X , we need a lower bound for the
cost of the optimal alternative X . By Lemma 3, we have that
SC(X) ≥ 1
1 + α
∑
Y ∈M
|Y ∗| · d(X, Y ). (3)
11
With these two inequalities, we are now able to bound the distortion as follows:
dist∑(f, σ) =
∑
Y ∈M p(Y ) SC(Y )
SC(X)
≤ p(X) +
∑
Y 6=X p(Y )
(
SC(X) +
(
n− 2
1+α
|Y ∗|) d(X, Y ))
SC(X)
(Due to Ineq. (2))
= 1 +
∑
Y 6=X p(Y )
(
n− 2
1+α
|Y ∗|) d(X, Y )
SC(X)
≤ 1 +
∑
Y 6=X p(Y )
(
n− 2
1+α
|Y ∗|) d(X, Y )
1
1+α
∑
Y ∈M |Y ∗| · d(X, Y )
(Due to Ineq. (3)),
which gives us the desired result.
The following theorem is our main result of this section. It states that in the worst case,
the distortion of randomized dictatorship is strictly better than 3 (in fact, it is at most 3− 2
n
,
which occurs when α = 1, |W ∗| = 1 in the theorem below). Thus, this simple randomized
mechanism has better distortion than any deterministic mechanism, since no deterministic
mechanism can have distortion strictly better than 3 in the worst case [1]. This is surprising
for several reasons. First, randomized dictatorship only operates on the first preferences of
every agent: there is no need to elicit the full preference ranking of every agent, only their top
choice. Second, randomized dictatorship is strategy-proof, unlike many deterministic mech-
anisms. Finally, randomized dictatorship can be thought of as a randomized generalization
of plurality or dictatorship. Both of these deterministic mechanisms have unbounded distor-
tion, which means that adding some randomization significantly improves the distortion of
these mechanisms.
Theorem 5 If a metric space is α-decisive, then the distortion of randomized dictatorship
is at most 2 + α− 2|W ∗|
n
, where W = argminY ∈M :|Y ∗|>0 |Y ∗|, and this bound is tight.
Proof. Let X be the optimal alternative. We first apply Lemma 4 and then use the
definition of |W ∗|:
dist∑(f, σ) ≤ 1 + (1 + α)
∑
Y ∈M p(Y )(n− 21+α |Y ∗|)d(X, Y )∑
Y ∈M |Y ∗|d(X, Y )
≤ 1 + (1 + α)
∑
Y ∈M p(Y )(n− 21+α |W ∗|)d(X, Y )∑
Y ∈M |Y ∗|d(X, Y )
= 1 +
(1 + α)
∑
Y ∈M
|Y ∗|
n
(
n− 2
1+α
|W ∗|) d(X, Y )∑
Y ∈M |Y ∗|d(X, Y )
= 1 +
(1 + α)
(
1− 2
1+α
|W ∗|
n
)∑
Y ∈M |Y ∗|d(X, Y )∑
Y ∈M |Y ∗|d(X, Y )
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n− 1 agents
X W
One agent
(1
2
+ ǫ) (1
2
− ǫ)
1
Figure 3: Consider the case where α = 1 and |W ∗| = 1. There are n − 1 agents located at
X who prefer X and one agent between X and W who prefers W . As ǫ→ 0, the worst-case
distortion of randomized dictatorship approaches 3− 2
n
.
= 2 + α− 2|W
∗|
n
.
We will now show that this bound is tight, using a generalized example of Figure 3. To
do this, we must show there exists a preference profile induced by an α-decisive metric space
where the distortion is at least 2 + α − 2|W ∗|
n
. We consider a preference profile in which
there are two alternatives W,X such that |W ∗| ≤ |X∗|. We will now show there exists an
α-decisive metric space that induces this profile that achieves the aforementioned distortion.
All agents i who prefer X have d(i, X) = 0 and d(i,W ) = 1. The remaining agents have
d(i,W ) = α
1+α
, d(i, X) = 1
1+α
. Clearly, all of the agents are α-decisive. We observe that
SC(X) = |W
∗|
1+α
and SC(W ) = α|W∗|
1+α
+ |X∗|. Thus, the distortion of randomized dictatorship
is
p(X) SC(X) + p(W ) SC(W )
SC(X)
=
|X∗|
n
+
|W ∗|
n
[
α
1+α
|W ∗|+ |X∗|
1
1+α
|W ∗|
]
=
(1 + α)|X∗|+ α|W ∗|+ |X∗|
n
=
(2 + α)(n− |W ∗|) + α|W ∗|
n
= 2 + α− 2|W
∗|
n
.
While randomized dictatorship performs well, it still does not achieve the lower bound
on distortion of 1 + α for randomized mechanisms. In general, we do not know of ran-
domized mechanisms that can achieve this bound. However, we will now define an optimal
mechanism for α-decisive metric spaces when there are m = 2 alternatives. This mechanism
is a generalization of proportional to squares that is parameterized by α. For α = 1, the
mechanism is in fact ordinary proportional to squares. This mechanism addresses the worst
cases of randomized dictatorship by placing more probability on alternatives that receive
vast majorities of the votes, if they exist.
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α-Generalized Proportional to Squares. We will provide a generalization of the pro-
portional to squares mechanism for m = 2 that is also a function of α. An alternative Y is
selected with probability
p(Y ) =
(1 + α)|Y ∗|2 − (1− α)|X∗||Y ∗|
(1 + α)(|X∗|2 + |Y ∗|2)− 2(1− α)|X∗||Y ∗| ,
where X is the second alternative.
Theorem 6 If a metric space is α-decisive and m = 2, then the distortion of α-generalized
proportional to squares is 1 + α, and this is tight.
Proof. Suppose X is optimal, and Y is the second alternative. By Lemma 4, we have that
the distortion is at most
1 +
(1 + α)p(Y )(n− 2
1+α
|Y ∗|)d(X, Y )
|Y ∗|d(X, Y ) .
Then, in order to bound the distortion, it suffices to simply use the fact that n = |X∗|+ |Y ∗|
and plug in p(Y ). We obtain a distortion of at most
1 +
(1 + α)p(Y )(|X∗|+ |Y ∗| − 2
1+α
|Y ∗|)d(X, Y )
|Y ∗|d(X, Y )
= 1 +
(1 + α)(|X∗| − 1−α
1+α
|Y ∗|) ((1 + α)|Y ∗| − (1− α)|X∗|)
(1 + α)(|X∗|2 + |Y ∗|2)− 2(1− α)|X∗||Y ∗|
= 1 +
2(1 + α2)|X∗||Y ∗| − (1 + α)(1− α)(|X∗|2 + |Y ∗|2)
(1 + α)(|X∗|2 + |Y ∗|2)− 2(1− α)|X∗||Y ∗|
=
(1 + α) (α|Y ∗|2 + α|X∗|2 + 2α|X∗||Y ∗|)
(1 + α)(|X∗|2 + |Y ∗|2)− 2(1− α)|X∗||Y ∗| .
In order to complete our proof, we must show that the numerator is at most a factor of 1+α
larger than the denominator. We claim that
α|Y ∗|2 + α|X∗|2 + 2α|X∗||Y ∗| ≤ (1 + α)(|X∗|2 + |Y ∗|2)− 2(1− α)|X∗||Y ∗|.
This follows from the fact that |X∗|2 + |Y ∗|2 − 2|X∗||Y ∗| = (|X∗| − |Y ∗|)2 ≥ 0. Thus, the
distortion is at most 1 + α, as desired.
3.2 1-Euclidean Preferences
We now consider a well-known and well-studied special case of 1-Euclidean preferences [15,34]
in which all agents and alternatives are on the real number line and the metric is defined to
be the Euclidean distance. First, we observe that in this setting, a Condorcet winner always
exists, so the distortion is at most 3, and this is tight for deterministic mechanisms. This is
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true due to the results in [1], which state that when an alternative is chosen which pairwise
defeats the optimal alternative, then the distortion is at most 3. In designing an optimal
randomized mechanism, we heavily use properties of this metric space from [15]. Namely,
using only the preference profile, we can determine the ordering of the agents on the line
(which is unique up to reversal and permutations of identical voters) and the unique ordering
of the alternatives that are between the top preference of the first agent and the top preference
of the last agent. While this information is not enough to find the optimal alternative, using
this information we will be able to significantly reduce the set of alternatives that can be
optimal. Then we will use α-generalized proportional to squares on this restricted set of
alternatives to achieve a better distortion bound. Our full mechanism is shown below as
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Optimal randomized mechanism for the α-decisive, 1-Euclidean space
Input: A preference profile σ
Output: A probability distribution p over the alternatives
>N← ordering of the agents [15]
>M← ordering of the alternatives [15]
i′ ← median agent of >N
X ← top preference of i′
Y ← alternative directly left of X in >M
Z ← alternative directly right of X in >M
if |Y X| < |ZX| then
p(Z)← (1 + α)|ZX|
2 − (1− α)|XZ||ZX|
(1 + α)(|XZ|2 + |ZX|2)− 2(1− α)|XZ||ZX|
p(X)← (1 + α)|XZ|
2 − (1− α)|XZ||ZX|
(1 + α)(|XZ|2 + |ZX|2)− 2(1− α)|XZ||ZX|
else if |Y X| > |ZX| then
p(Y )← (1 + α)|Y X|
2 − (1− α)|XY ||Y X|
(1 + α)(|XY |2 + |Y X|2)− 2(1− α)|XY ||YX|
p(X)← (1 + α)|XY |
2 − (1− α)|XY ||Y X|
(1 + α)(|XY |2 + |Y X|2)− 2(1− α)|XY ||Y X|
else
p(X)← 1
end if
We will now show that this mechanism has worst-case distortion at most 1 + α through
a series of steps in which we reduce the set of possible optimal alternatives from m to 2. In
our first lemma, we show that the optimal alternative must be one of the two alternatives
on either side of the median agent from our agent ordering. One of these alternatives must
be the top preference of the median agent. However, since we do not know if the median
agent’s top preference is to the left or right of it, we must consider three alternatives: her
top preference and the two alternatives on either side of the top preference. This reduces
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our set of optimal alternatives from m to 3.
Lemma 7 In the 1-Euclidean setting, consider the median agent i′. Let this agent’s top
preference be X. Call the alternatives directly to the left and right of this alternative Y and
Z, respectively. Then X, Y or Z must be optimal.
Proof. Suppose that X is to the left of the median voter. Then X has x ≥ n
2
agents
to the right of it who prefer X over Y . For these agents i, d(i, Y ) = d(i, X) + d(X, Y ),
while the remaining n− x agents i have d(i, X) ≤ d(i, Y ) + d(X, Y ). Thus, ∑i∈N d(i, X) ≤∑
i∈N d(i, Y )−x · d(X, Y )+ (n−x) · d(X, Y ) ≤
∑
i∈N d(i, Y ), which implies that the quality
of X is always at least as good as Y . This same argument can be used for any alternative
to the left of X .
We observe that if X is left of the median voter, Z must be to the right of the median
voter because if not, then the median voter would prefer Z over X . Since at least n
2
agents
to the left of Z prefer it over any alternative to the right of it, we can use the same argument
to show that Z is better than all of these alternatives. Thus, X or Z must be optimal.
Finally, if X to the right of the median voter, we can show that X or Y must be the
optimal alternative. However, since it is not possible to determine if X is to the left or right
of the median voter, then we know that one of X , Y , or Z must be optimal.
Next, we show that we can further reduce the set of possible optimal alternatives from 3
to 2.
Lemma 8 If |Y X| ≤ |ZX|, then Y cannot be better than X, and if |ZX| ≤ |Y X|, Z cannot
be better than X.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that |Y X| ≤ |ZX|. Then, since all agents in
ZX must be to the right of X , we have that∑
i∈N
d(i, X) =
∑
i∈ZX
(d(i, Y )− d(X, Y )) +
∑
i/∈ZX
d(i, X)
≤
∑
i∈ZX
(d(i, Y )− d(X, Y )) +
∑
i∈X∗
d(i, Y ) +
∑
i∈Y X
(d(i, Y ) + d(X, Y ))
=
∑
i∈N
d(i, Y )− |ZX|d(X, Y ) + |YX|d(X, Y )
≤
∑
i∈N
d(i, Y ).
Note that ZX and Y X are disjoint, since agents in ZX must be to the right of X and agents
in Y X must be to the left of X . Because of this, the third transition above is an equality.
Thus, we have shown that Y cannot be better than X .
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Finally, we can use the α-generalized proportional to squares mechanism on the restricted
set of alternatives X and one of Y, Z to achieve a distortion of 1+α, which is tight since our
lower bound example from Theorem 1 occurs in the 1-Euclidean setting. In the event that
|Y X| = |ZX|, then we can select X with probability 1, since neither Y nor Z can be better
than X .
Theorem 9 In the 1-Euclidean setting, Algorithm 1 has distortion at most 1 + α, and thus
has the best possible worst-case distortion.
Proof. Let X, Y, Z be as defined in the algorithm. If |Y X| = |ZX|, then by Lemma 8 it
must be that X has better social cost than Y or Z, and by Lemma 7, this means that X
must be the optimum outcome. Therefore, our algorithm selects X with probability 1, and
achieves distortion of 1.
Now suppose that |Y X| > |ZX|, without loss of generality. By Lemma 8 this means that
X has better social cost than Z and that one of X or Y must be the optimum alternative.
Assume that X is optimal instead of Y (the proof of the other case is identical). Since
we are in the 1-Euclidean setting, we know that every agent in Y X \ Y ∗ is to the left of
Y . Therefore, for all i ∈ Y X \ Y ∗, d(i, X) = d(i, Y ) + d(X, Y ). Using this fact, as well
ad the definition of α-decisiveness and the triangle inequality which states that d(i, Y ) ≤
d(i, X) + d(X, Y ), we can derive an improved upper bound on the social cost of Y :
SC(Y ) =
∑
ı∈N
d(i, Y )
=
∑
i∈Y ∗
d(i, Y ) +
∑
i∈Y X\Y ∗
d(i, Y ) +
∑
i∈XY
d(i, Y )
≤ α
∑
i∈Y ∗
d(i, X) +
∑
i∈Y X\Y ∗
(d(i, X)− d(X, Y )) +
∑
i∈XY
(d(i, X) + d(X, Y ))
We continue to derive a better bound on the social cost of Y from the above; the second
inequality below is due to Lemma 2.
SC(Y ) ≤
≤
∑
i∈N
d(i, X)− (1− α)
∑
i∈Y ∗
d(i, X) + (|XY | − |Y X \ Y ∗|) d(X, Y )
= SC(X)− (1− α)
∑
i∈Y ∗
d(i, X) + (|XY | − |YX \ Y ∗|) d(X, Y )
≤ SC(X)− 1− α
1 + α
∑
i∈Y ∗
d(X, Y ) + (|XY | − |Y X \ Y ∗|) d(X, Y )
= SC(X) +
(
|XY | − |Y X \ Y ∗| − 1− α
1 + α
|Y ∗|
)
d(X, Y )
= SC(X) +
(
n− 2
1 + α
|Y X| − 2α
1 + α
|Y X \ Y ∗|
)
d(X, Y ).
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We can also derive an improved lower bound for the social cost of X , the last inequality
below is again due to Lemma 2.
SC(X) =
∑
i∈Y ∗
d(i, X) +
∑
i∈Y X\Y ∗
d(i, X) +
∑
i∈XY
d(i, X)
≥
∑
i∈Y ∗
d(i, X) +
∑
i∈Y X\Y ∗
d(i, X)
=
∑
i∈Y ∗
d(i, X) +
∑
i∈Y X\Y ∗
(d(i, Y ) + d(X, Y ))
≥
∑
i∈Y ∗
d(i, X) +
∑
i∈Y X\Y ∗
d(X, Y )
≥ 1
1 + α
|Y ∗|d(X, Y ) + |Y X \ Y ∗|d(X, Y )
=
1
1 + α
(|Y X|+ α|YX \ Y ∗|) d(X, Y )
We can now bound the distortion using these two inequalities. We will demonstrate that
the distortion is maximized when there are no agents to the left of Y , i.e., |Y X \ Y ∗| = 0⇒
|Y ∗| = |Y X|. As we have seen, the distortion is also maximized when ∀i ∈ |XY |, d(i, X) = 0.
Thus, we will have effectively reduced the problem to the case where m = 2.
p(Y )SC(Y ) + p(X)SC(X)
SC(X)
≤ p(Y )
(
SC(X) +
(
n− 2
1+α
|Y X| − 2α
1+α
|Y X \ Y ∗|) d(X, Y ))+ p(X) SC(X)
SC(X)
= 1 +
p(Y )
(
n− 2
1+α
|Y X| − 2α
1+α
|Y X \ Y ∗|) d(X, Y )
SC(X)
≤ 1 + p(Y )
(
n− 2
1+α
|Y X| − 2α
1+α
|Y X \ Y ∗|) d(X, Y )
1
1+α
(|Y X|+ α|YX \ Y ∗|) d(X, Y )
= 1 +
p(Y ) ((1 + α)n− 2|Y X| − 2α|Y X \ Y ∗|)
|Y X|+ α|YX \ Y ∗|
If we hold |YX| constant, we observe that the distortion is decreasing in |Y X \Y ∗|. In other
words, the distortion is maximized when |Y X| = |Y ∗|. If we set |Y X \ Y ∗| = 0 in the above
distortion bound, then the remainder of this proof proceeds identically as in the proof of
Theorem 6.
3.3 Distortion in the (m− 1)-Simplex
In this section we consider a specialized, yet natural, setting inspired by [1], known as the
(m−1)-simplex setting. In this setting, we assume that them alternatives are all at distance 1
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from each other and for every agent i, for all Y ∈M , we have that d(i, Y ) ≤ 1. This includes
the case when m alternatives are the vertices of the (m− 1)-simplex and all of the agents lie
inside this simplex. Although this is a very constrained setting, it is a reasonable assumption
in the case when all of the alternatives are uncorrelated, i.e., when all the alternatives are
equally different from one another. For example, when choosing where to allocate money, it
may be that for a die-hard fan of alternative X , all other alternatives are equally bad. When
choosing which of three services X , Y , or Z to improve, someone who only uses service X
will have equally large cost for both alternative Y or Z, since they do not benefit from them.
On the other hand, a person using all three services equally may be indifferent between the
alternatives. When the question is ”Should we improve the highway system in New York,
California, or Texas?”, someone who lives in New York would want their roads improved,
not someone else’s, while someone who often visits all three states may be more indifferent
between the alternatives.
In this setting, the distortion of randomized dictatorship does not improve because the
worst case occurs on a line. However, we will see that plurality and the proportional to
squares mechanism are good for any number of alternatives in this setting.
Theorem 10 If the (m − 1)-simplex setting is α-decisive, then plurality has distortion at
most 1 + 2α.
Proof. Suppose X is the optimal alternative, andW is the alternative selected by plurality.
For convenience, define δ =
∑
i∈W ∗ d(i, X).
By Lemma 2, we know that SC(X) ≥ δ + 1
1+α
∑
Y 6=X,W |Y ∗|d(X, Y ), which equals δ +
1
1+α
(n− |X∗| − |W ∗|) since in the simplex setting distances between all alternatives equal
1. Furthermore, since in the simplex setting all distances d(i,W ) are at most one, we have
that SC(W ) ≤ n− |W ∗|+∑i∈W ∗ d(i,W ) ≤ n− |W ∗|+ αδ; the last inequality is due to the
definition of α-decisiveness.
Putting this together, we have that the distortion is at most
αδ + (n− |W ∗|)
δ + 1
1+α
(n− |X∗| − |W ∗|) .
This bound is decreasing with δ (since n− |W ∗| > α · 1
1+α
(n− |X∗| − |W ∗|)), and so is
maximized for δ being as small as possible. By the triangle inequality, and the fact that
d(X,W ) = 1 for simplex settings, we know that 1 ≤ d(i,W )+d(i, X) for each i ∈ W ∗. Since
d(i,W ) ≤ α · d(i, X) by definition of decisiveness, this means that 1 ≤ (1 + α)d(i, X), and
thus δ ≥ 1
1+α
|W ∗|. Plugging this into the expression above, we obtain that the distortion is
at most
α
1+α
|W ∗|+ (n− |W ∗|)
1
1+α
|W ∗|+ 1
1+α
(n− |X∗| − |W ∗|) =
(1 + α)n− |W ∗|
n− |X∗|
≤ (1 + α)n− |X
∗|
n− |X∗|
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= 1 +
α · n
n− |X∗| .
Since |X∗| ≤ |W ∗|, it follows that |X∗| ≤ n
2
. Thus, 1 + α·n
n−|X∗| , which is increasing in |X∗|, is
maximized when |X∗| = n
2
. We conclude that the distortion is at most 1 + 2α.
Plurality, although a deterministic mechanism, does very well in this setting, because for
α = 0 the alternative with the most votes is clearly optimal. In general, as α→ 0, the agents
are forced closer to the vertices of the simplex, and plurality better approximates finding
the optimal alternative. However, when α is not small, plurality fares poorly compared to
the proportional to squares mechanism. Indeed, for α ≤ 1
7
, plurality has a better upper
bound on distortion than proportional to squares, but otherwise the opposite is true. The
difference becomes more obvious for high α: for α = 1 (i.e., for general metrics), proportional
to squares has distortion at most 2, while plurality has distortion at most 3.
Theorem 11 If the (m− 1)-simplex setting is α-decisive, the proportional to squares mech-
anism has distortion at most 1
2
(
1 + α +
√
2
√
α2 + 1
)
.
Proof. Suppose X is the optimal alternative. For convenience, define δY =
∑
i∈Y ∗ d(i, X)
for any alternative Y 6= X . We begin by proceeding identically to the proof of Theorem 10.
Thus we obtain that, for all Y 6= X , it holds that
SC(Y )
SC(X)
≤ αδY + (n− |Y
∗|)
δY +
1
1+α
(n− |X∗| − |Y ∗|) ,
and furthermore that
SC(Y )
SC(X)
≤ (1 + α)n− |Y
∗|
n− |X∗| .
This is because until this point in the proof of Theorem 10, we do not use anywhere that we
are comparing X with the outcome chosen by plurality; this comparison holds for the costs
of arbitrary alternatives.
Now, let γ = (n− |X∗|) ·∑Z∈M |Z∗|2. If p(Y ) is the probability of alternative Y be-
ing chosen by the proportional to squares mechanism, then the expected distortion of this
mechanism is equal to∑
Y ∈M p(Y ) SC(Y )
SC(X)
= p(X) +
∑
Y 6=X
|Y ∗|2
·∑Z∈M |Z∗|2
(
SC(Y )
SC(X)
)
≤ p(X) +
∑
Y 6=X
|Y ∗|2
·∑Z∈M |Z∗|2
(
(1 + α)n− |Y ∗|
n− |X∗|
)
= p(X) +
1 + α
γ
∑
Y 6=X
(
α
1 + α
|Y ∗|3 + |Y ∗|2
∑
Z 6=Y
|Z∗|
)
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=
1 + α
γ
(
1
1 + α
|X∗|2(n− |X∗|) +
∑
Y 6=X
(
α
1 + α
|Y ∗|3 + |Y ∗|2
∑
Z 6=Y
|Z∗|
))
=
1 + α
γ
(
1
1 + α
|X∗|2
∑
Y 6=X
|Y ∗|+ |X∗|
∑
Y 6=X
|Y ∗|2 +
∑
Y 6=X
(
α
1 + α
|Y ∗|3 + |Y ∗|2
∑
Z 6=Y,X
|Z∗|
))
.
Let β = 1+
√
2
√
α2+1
α+1
. If we want to obtain the desired bound of 1
2
(
1 + α+
√
2
√
α2 + 1
)
,
we must show that
1
1 + α
|X∗|2
∑
Y 6=X
|Y ∗|+ |X∗|
∑
Y 6=X
|Y ∗|2 +
∑
Y 6=X
(
α
1 + α
|Y ∗|3 + |Y ∗|2
∑
Z 6=Y,X
|Z∗|
)
≤ 1
2
(
1 + α+
√
2
√
α2 + 1
) γ
1 + α
=
1
2
β (n− |X∗|)
∑
Z∈M
|Z∗|2
=
1
2
β
(
|X∗|2
∑
Y 6=X
|Y ∗|+
∑
Y 6=X
(
|Y ∗|3 + |Y ∗|2
∑
Z 6=Y,X
|Y ∗|
))
We can further simplify this inequality by canceling terms on both sides. We note that
1
2
β ≥ 1 ≥ 1
1+α
≥ α
1+α
. First, we consider an alternative Y 6= X . On the LHS, |Y ∗|3 terms
have a coefficient of α
1+α
, while on the RHS, they have a coefficient of 1
2
β. We subtract
α
1+α
|Y ∗|3 from both sides. Similarly, for |Y ∗|2∑Z 6=Y,X |Z∗| terms, we have a coefficient of 1
on the LHS and a coefficient of 1
2
β on the RHS. We subtract |Y ∗|2∑Z 6=Y,X |Z∗| from both
sides. We repeat this process for all Y 6= X .
Next we consider terms that contain |X∗|. We observe that neither side has |X∗|3 terms.
The term |X∗|2∑Y 6=X |Y ∗| has a coefficient of 11+α on the LHS, while it has a coefficient of
1
2
β on the RHS. Thus, we subtract 1
1+α
|X∗|2∑Y 6=X |Y ∗| from both sides. Finally, we consider
the term |X∗|∑Y 6=X |Y ∗|2. The LHS has this term with a coefficient of 1, while the RHS
does not have this term at all. We note that this is the only term remaining on the LHS
after cancellation.
After all of this canceling, this leaves us with needing to prove that
|X∗|
∑
Y 6=X
|Y ∗|2 ≤ 1
2
∑
Y 6=X
((
β − 2α
1 + α
)
|Y ∗|3 +
(
β − 2
1 + α
)
|Y ∗||X∗|2 + (β − 2) |Y ∗|2
∑
Z 6=X,Y
|Z∗|
)
.
In fact, we will prove that
|X∗|
∑
Y 6=X
|Y ∗|2 ≤ 1
2
∑
Y 6=X
((
β − 2α
1 + α
)
|Y ∗|3 +
(
β − 2
1 + α
)
|Y ∗||X∗|2
)
,
which will imply the above inequality, since
∑
Y 6=X (β − 2) |Y ∗|2
∑
Z 6=X,Y |Z∗| is always non-
negative.
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We observe that
∑
Y 6=X
((
β − 2α
1 + α
)
|Y ∗|3 +
(
β − 2
1 + α
)
|Y ∗||X∗|2 − 2|Y ∗|2|X∗|
)
=
∑
Y 6=X
|Y ∗|
((
β − 2α
1 + α
)
|Y ∗|2 +
(
β − 2
1 + α
)
|X∗|2 − 2|Y ∗||X∗|
)
,
which we claim is non-negative. Proving that this quantity is non-negative completes our
proof. First, we claim that it follows from simple algebra that the product of
(
β − 2
1+α
)
and(
β − 2α
1+α
)
is 1. Thus, for any Y 6= X , we can show that
(
β − 2α
1 + α
)
|Y ∗|2+
(
β − 2
1 + α
)
|X∗|2−2|Y ∗||X∗| =
(
|Y ∗|
√
β − 2α
1 + α
− |X∗|
√
β − 2
1 + α
)2
≥ 0,
which implies that the summation over these terms is non-negative as well.
Unlike all of the previous distortion bounds we have provided, this is the first that is
not linearly increasing in α. It increases slower than the distortion of plurality, which is
1 + 2α. For smaller values of α, such as α = 0, which is where plurality has the largest
advantage over proportional to squares, the distortion of proportional to squares is still at
most 1+
√
2
2
≈ 1.2071, which is reasonably small. For 1 ≥ α ≥ .5, the values of 1 + α
and 1
2
(
1 + α+
√
2
√
α2 + 1
)
are relatively close. Since we have 1 + α as a lower bound for
all randomized mechanisms, this implies that proportional to squares is nearly optimal for
sufficiently large values of α. We suspect that the optimal mechanism in the (m−1)-simplex
setting is in fact a modified version of α-generalized proportional to squares that works for
arbitrary m, and we think it should have a distortion upper bound of 1 + α.
4 Median Agent Cost
4.1 General Metric Spaces
In this section, we will examine the median objective function. In [1], it was shown than no
deterministic mechanism can achieve a worst-case distortion of better than 5, and that the
Copeland mechanism achieves this bound. We begin this section by showing that random-
ized mechanisms have a general worst-case distortion lower bound of 3 rather than 5 like
deterministic mechanisms.
Theorem 12 For m ≥ 2, the worst-case median distortion is at least 3 for all randomized
mechanisms.
Proof. We must show there exists a preference profile such that for all randomized mech-
anisms, there always exists a metric space that induces the preference profile and where the
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Figure 4: There are n
2
agents between W and X that prefer W , one agent to the right of
X that prefers X , and n
2
− 1 agents who are far from both alternatives but prefer W . If a
social choice function selects W with probability 1, then the worst-case median distortion is
at least 3.
distortion is at least 3. We will consider a preference profile with two alternatives W,X and
n agents. In this profile, there are n− 1 agents that prefer W over X , while the remaining
agent prefers X over W . We claim that no randomized mechanism can achieve distortion
< 3 for all metric spaces that induce this profile.
First, we claim that there exist metric spaces where the distortion is unbounded if X is
picked with any positive probability. For example, suppose for all agents that prefer W over
X , d(i,W ) = 0, d(i, X) = 1. The agent that prefers X over W has d(i,W ) = 1, d(i, X) = 0.
Thus, med(W ) = 0 and med(X) = 1. Thus, we conclude that any randomized mechanism
with p(X) > 0 for the given preference profile has unbounded worst-case distortion.
In order to complete our proof, we only need to consider randomized mechanisms that
select W with probability 1, given the aforementioned preference profile. We will show there
exists a metric space in which the distortion is at least 3 for these mechanisms. Consider the
following metric space: there are n
2
agents with d(i,W ) = 1
2
− ǫ and d(i, X) = 1
2
+ ǫ. One
agent has d(i,W ) = 3
2
, d(i, X) = 1
2
. The remaining agents who prefer W have d(i,W ) >
2, d(i, X) > 2. Then med(X) = 1
2
+ǫ and med(W ) = 3
2
. Since med(W ) approaches 3·med(X)
as ǫ→ 0, and p(W ) = 1, the distortion approaches 3.
From this example, we are able to conclude that both randomized dictatorship and
proportional to squares have unbounded distortion, even for m = 2.
We now present the main result of this section: designing a randomized mechanism which
will always achieve a distortion of at most 4 for the median objective. We claim that to design
a randomized mechanism for the median objective, it makes sense to consider the uncovered
set, which is the set of alternatives X that pairwise defeats every other alternative Y either
directly (i.e. X pairwise defeats Y ) or indirectly through another alternative Z (i.e. X does
not pairwise defeat Y , but X pairwise defeats Z, which in turn pairwise defeats Y ). From [1],
we have the following two lemmas concerning the quality of alternatives in the uncovered
23
set.
Lemma 13 ( [1]) If an alternative W pairwise defeats (or pairwise ties) the alternative X,
then med(W ) ≤ 3 ·med(X) for all metric preferences.
Lemma 14 ( [1]) If an alternative W is in the uncovered set, then med(W ) ≤ 5 ·med(X)
for all metric preferences, where X is any alternative.
These two lemmas suggest that if we want to achieve distortion better than 5, we should
not deterministically pick a single alternative from the uncovered set because we do not know
of a way to ensure we do not pick an alternative that is a factor of 5 away. Indeed, this is
what can happen with Copeland. Instead, we want to mix over the entire uncovered set and
ensure that some alternatives that pairwise defeat the optimal alternative (i.e., alternatives
only a factor of 3 away) are chosen with high probability to decrease the distortion. However,
since we do not know the optimal alternative, we must have this property hold for every
alternative. This is made precise in the following theorem. Let G = (M,E) be the majority
graph, i.e., a graph in which the alternatives are vertices and the edges denote pairwise
victories: an edge (Y, Z) ∈ E if Y is preferred to Z by a strict majority of the voters.
Let S be the uncovered set, and p be some probability distribution over S. Finally, define
π(Y ) for any alternative Y to be the total probability distribution “covered” by Y , i.e.,
π(Y ) =
∑
(Y,Z)∈E p(Z). Then, we have the following statement.
Theorem 15 If a mechanism selects alternatives only from the uncovered set S with prob-
ability distribution p, and if for all alternatives X we have that π(X) ≤ 1
2
, then the expected
median distortion of this mechanism is at most 4.
Proof. Let G = (M,E) be the majority graph in which ties are broken arbitrarily, and let
X be the optimal alternative. By Lemmas 13 and 14, we know the expected distortion is at
most
1 · p(X) +
∑
Z∈S:(Z,X)∈E
3 · p(Z) +
∑
Z∈S:(X,Z)∈E
5 · p(Z).
Since π(X) ≤ 1
2
, this means that
∑
Z∈S:(X,Z)∈E p(Z) ≤ 12 . Since the distortion can be
at worst 5 with probability 1
2
and otherwise has distortion at most 3, we conclude that the
distortion of this mechanism is at most 4.
Thus, we want a mechanism that manages to ensure that for every alternative X , the
alternatives that can be more than a factor of 3 away from X (i.e., the ones it pairwise
defeats) are selected with probability at most 1
2
. The mechanism we describe, Uncovered
Set Min-Cover, uses a linear program to accomplish this. We define the subset of the edges
on the uncovered set as E(S) = {E = (Y, Z) : Y ∈ S, Z ∈ S}. We also give the LP (and its
dual which is not used by the algorithm, but is necessary for our proofs), which is used as a
subroutine by our mechanism.
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(Linear Program) (Dual)
minimize pmax maximize bmin
subject to pY ≥ 0, Y ∈ S subject to bY ≥ 0, Y ∈ S∑
(Y,Z)∈E(S)
pZ ≤ pmax, Y ∈ S
∑
(Z,Y )∈E(S)
bZ ≥ bmin, Y ∈ S
∑
Z∈S
pZ = 1.
∑
Z∈S
bZ = 1.
Algorithm 2 Uncovered Set Min-Cover
Input: A preference profile σ
Output: A probability distribution p over the alternatives of the uncovered set
G = (M,E)← majority graph of σ
S ← uncovered set of G
p← solution to LP (see above)
Now we must show that this mechanism actually has low distortion, i.e., the following
theorem.
Theorem 16 The expected median distortion of Uncovered Set Min-Cover is at most 4.
This theorem is immediate from Theorem 15 if we can show that for the distribution
formed by Uncovered Set Min-Cover, we have that π(X) ≤ 1
2
for all X . We prove this fact
using the following two lemmas.
Lemma 17 Let G = (M,E) be the majority graph in which ties are broken arbitrarily. For
the dual of LP, it must be that bmin ≤ 12 .
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that for all Y ∈ S, ∑(Z,Y )∈E(S) bZ > 12 , which
implies that
∑
(Y,Z)∈E(S) bZ <
1
2
. Then we can derive that
1
2
<
∑
Y ∈S
bY
∑
(Z,Y )∈E(S)
bZ
=
∑
Y ∈S
∑
(Z,Y )∈E(S)
bY bZ
=
∑
(Z,Y )∈E(S)
bY bZ
=
∑
Y ∈S
bY
∑
(Y,Z)∈E(S)
bZ
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<
1
2
,
which is a contradiction.
Due to LP-Duality, the above lemma immediately implies that pmax ≤ 12 , and thus
π(X) ≤ 1
2
for all X ∈ S. This does not complete the proof of Theorem 16, however, since
it is possible that the optimal alternative X is outside of the uncovered set S. To finish the
proof of the theorem, we also need the following lemma.
Lemma 18 Suppose we have a probability distribution p over alternatives in the uncovered
set S, and for all Y ∈ S, we have that π(Y ) = ∑(Y,Z)∈E p(Z) ≤ 12 . Then, this also must
hold for alternatives outside of S, i.e., for all X 6∈ S, we also have that π(X) ≤ 1
2
.
Proof. Consider an alternative X 6∈ S, and let U be the set of alternatives “covered” by
X in S, i.e., that X pairwise defeats. Suppose to the contrary that π(X) > 1
2
, i.e., that∑
Z∈U p(Z) >
1
2
. Since X is not in the uncovered set, there must be some alternative W1
which pairwise defeats X and all the alternatives in U as well (if such W1 did not exist then
X would defeat everyone either directly or in two hops, and thus would be in S). If W1 ∈ S,
then π(W1) >
1
2
since it defeats all of U , leading us to a contradiction since all alternatives
in S cover less than half of the total probability mass. If, on the other hand, W1 6∈ S, then
by the same argument there must be some alternative W2 which defeats all of U , X , andW1.
We continue in this way until we obtain some alternative Wk which must be in S, giving us
the desired contradiction.
This completes the proof of Theorem 16: by Lemma 17 we have that π(X) ≤ 1
2
for all
X ∈ S, by Lemma 18 we have that this is true even for X 6∈ S, and by Theorem 15 we
obtain the desired distortion bound.
4.2 Median Distortion for 1-Euclidean and Simplex Metrics
We complete this section by considering special metric spaces. In the case of 1-Euclidean,
we are trivially able to obtain the optimal mechanism: selecting the Condorcet winner, since
such a winner is guaranteed to exist for the 1-Euclidean setting. By Lemma 13, we know
that the Condorcet winner is guaranteed to be within a factor of 3 of the optimal alternative.
In the (m− 1)-simplex setting, we will see that almost any alternative is of high median
quality. This is due to the fact that the alternatives are very spread out. Unless an alternative
has at least n
2
agents very close to it, its median cost is guaranteed to be at least 1
2
in general
metric spaces. The following result shows than any mechanism which selects an alternative
preferred by more than n
2
voters as their top choice (if one exists) will have low median
distortion. Thus, for example, plurality is a good mechanism for this setting.
Theorem 19 If the (m− 1)-simplex setting is α-decisive, any mechanism that satisfies the
majority criterion has median distortion at most 1 + α.
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Proof. We begin by noting the following useful fact: for any alternative Y with |Y ∗| ≤ n
2
,
it must be that med(Y ) ≥ 1
1+α
. Note that for the case when n is even, med(Y ) refers to the
distance of the (n
2
+ 1)-th furthest voter from Y . This fact is true because at most n
2
agents
have Y as their first preference, and the remaining agents have d(i, Y ) ≥ 1
1+α
by Lemma 2
and the fact that the distances between all alternatives equal 1 due to the simplex setting.
If there is no strict majority winner (i.e., all alternatives have at most n
2
agents choosing
them as their top preference), then the above fact immediately implies the desired bound on
median distortion. This is because any alternative W has med(W ) ≤ 1, since for all i ∈ N ,
we have that d(i,W ) ≤ 1 due to this being the simplex setting. Therefore, the distortion is
always at most 1 + α, since the median cost of any alternative lies between 1
1+α
and 1.
Now we consider the case when there is a strict majority winner W , i.e., an alternative
such that |W ∗| > n
2
. Let X be the optimum alternative (i.e., the one minimizing med(X)).
If X = W , then the distortion is 1, so assume that X 6= W . Then, for every i ∈ W ∗, we
know that d(i,W ) ≤ α · d(i, X) (since the distances are α-decisive), and that d(i, X) ≤ 1
(since this is the (m − 1)-simplex setting). Therefore, it must be that med(W ) ≤ α. Due
to the useful fact proven above, we know that med(X) ≥ 1
1+α
, and the distortion is at most
α(1 + α) ≤ 1 + α, as desired.
5 Conclusion
We analyzed the distortion of randomized social choice mechanisms in a setting where agent
costs form a metric space. In cases where randomized mechanisms are appropriate, such
as when the choice will be repeated many times, or when the probability p(Y ) can be
thought of as the amount of power that candidate Y gets, with the total amount of power
summing to 1, then a very small amount of information is necessary to form mechanisms
with very small distortion. The randomized mechanisms we consider, such as randomized
dictatorship and proportional to squares, require only the first preference of each agent
(and do not require the agent costs to be known) to achieve distortion better than any
known deterministic mechanism, despite the fact that the best deterministic mechanisms
require the full preference profile. Thus, randomized mechanisms can perform better with
less information. We also considered special cases of metrics, such as when agents have a
strong preference towards their first choice over the second, when agent preferences are 1-
Euclidean, and when all alternatives are completely dissimilar, and we were able to achieve
better distortion bounds using randomized mechanisms. This was true even for the more
“egalitarian” median objective, in which we were able to provide a probability distribution
based on the majority graph with distortion better than any deterministic mechanism.
Some open questions still remain. While we were able to show that proportional to
squares is an optimal mechanism for m = 2 alternatives in the sum setting, our best known
mechanism for arbitrary m is randomized dictatorship, which has a distortion arbitrarily
close to 3 in the worst case. We suspect there may exist a generalization of proportional to
squares that is able to achieve a distortion of 2, but it is likely significantly more complex
and may require the full preference profile instead of agents’ top preferences.
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More generally, this paper studies how well algorithms and mechanisms which only have
access to limited ordinal information, instead of the ground truth, can compete with truly
omniscient algorithms. These questions are larger than just social choice, and apply to
other settings as well, for example matchings, as described in the Introduction. At least
for metric settings, it seems that knowing only ordinal information is often enough; there
is no need to elicit complex numerical information. Looking at other utility structures in
addition to metric spaces would also make sense, such as specific metric spaces which model
particular applications (e.g., doubling metrics), or algorithms which know limited numerical
information (e.g., the order of magnitude of the agent utilities), but must compete with
omniscient mechanisms. Finally, it would be interesting to analyze the normative properties
of mechanisms with small distortion: it may be possible to characterize the entire space
of mechanisms which have, e.g., distortion at most 3 and obey certain desirable axiomatic
properties.
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